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TAX TREATMENT OF "LESSORS" AND "LESSEES" UNDER
LEASE-PURCHASE AGREEMENTS*
THE Internal Revenue Code treats differently business rental payments
and payments made pursuant to a purchase of depreciable business property.
The lessee may deduct rent as a business expense under Section 23(a) (1)
(A).' But this section forbids deduction when the taxpayer is "taking title"
or has an "equity" in the property. Instead, he usually may depreciate the
property.2 On the other hand, the lessor reports rent as ordinary incume, ;
and he may take depreciation deductions.4 If payments are received as part
of a "sale or exchange" of his property, the taxpayer cannot deduct deprecia-
tion, but his "gain" may be taxable at the lower capital gains rate; under
Section 117(j)."
Courts are forced to apply the Code's rent-purchase distinctions to contracts
which use "lease" form and terminology but Pive the lessee an option to buy
Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952).
1. "In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions . . . all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business, including ... rentals or other payments required to be made
as a condition to the continued use or possession, for the purposes of the trade or business,
of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not tadng title or in which
he has no equity." INr. RxEv. CoDE § 23(a) (1) (A). See 4 Mimr.ams, Farn-.A I:co'.-M
TAXATION § 25.93 et scq. (1942); 1 MiON:r-o.EPv, FE.uZnAL TAXES 569-75 (1952).
2. I--r. REv. CoDo § 23(1) (1). Under an executory contract of sale, before legal titlV
has passed, the vendee may take a depreciation deduction if he is in possession of the
property and "assumes the burdens of ownership." I.T. 2275, V-I Cu . BUL.. 62, 63
(1926). See also 4 fM1rETxs, FED AL Ixcom TAXATbox §§ 23.06, 23.11 (1942);
Chicago-Stoker Corp., 14 T.C. 441, 445 (1950); Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25, 30 (1943).
Although "rentals" which are not deductible under § 23(a) (1) (A) may be added to the
property's § 113 adjusted basis and deducted later as depreciation, the larger immediate
rent deduction would seem more desirable to most lessees under lease-purchase agree-
ments.
3. INT. Rv. CoDn § 22(a).
4. I-zT. REv. CoDE § 23(1) (1).
5. Depreciable or real property used in trade or business is prccludcd from capital
gains treatment under § 117(a). But a gain from the sale or exchange of such property,
if held more than six months, is taxable under § 117(j ) at the long term capital gain rates
if the aggregate of "117(j) transactions" for the year is a net gain.
Section 23(l) allows a depreciation deduction for property used in trade or business
or "held" for the production of income. Generally, depreciation is allowed to the party
who will suffer economic loss by a decline in value. The legal owner usually meets this
test. See 2 P-H 1952 FEo. TAX SEmv. 1 14,030, and cases cited therein. But the criterion
of "holding the property" also permits the vendee under installment or conditional sales
contracts to take depreciation. See I.T. 2275, V-1 Cum. Buu.- 62 (1926); 1 MoNT-
Gomm.y, FEDrA.Li TAXES 917-18 (1952).
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the property.6 In some cases, the contract's purpose is clear and the tax
consequences are well settled. If the lessee is obligated to pay rent for the
entire term and may take title after all payments are completed without
paying an additional sum, the lease is actually a disguised conditional sale ;7
both lessee and lessor thus report the periodic payments as part of the pur-
chase price.8 But variations of two other types of lease-purchase agreements
have caused much confusion. 9 The first is similar to the disguised conditional
sale except that the lessee is not legally bound to make all the payments; he
6. Motives for adopting the lease-option form vary. This device affords the pro-
spective purchaser a means of testing the property before promising to buy. It assures
him the full benefit of costly improvemenlts and of favorable fluctuations in the price level.
For these purposes the lease-option agreement is a useful commercial device. On the
other hand, vendor and purchaser may desire to escape local taxes, Robert A. Taft,
27 B.T.A. 808 (1933) (lease option form adopted to avoid high tax on purchase money
mortgages); or to circumvent statutory regulation of installment sales, William
A. McWaters, P-H 1950 TC Mur. DEC. 1 50,152 (1950) (minimum down-payment re-
quirements) ; E. G. Robertson, 19 B.T.A. 534 (1930) (redemption statutes which delay
vendor's repossession after a default).
Income tax avoidance may also be sought. Lessee may wish to amortize a down pay-
ment, Robert A. Taft, supra; or depreciate improvements over a relatively short lease
term, Rankin v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1932) ; or deduct rentals as a business
expense, Jefferson Gas Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 52 F2d 120 (3d Cir. 1931). Lessor
may wish to avoid an immediate tax on his gain from the sale, A.R.M. 189, 1-2 CuM.
Bumt. 68 (1922). For a short discussion of lease-option income tax treatment, see Siegel,
Options to Buy or Renew Contained in a Lease in PRocEE~nGs or N.Y.U. 6Tu Ann.
INSTTUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATioN 990 (1948). See also 4 MmRTENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 25.93 n24 (1942) ; 4 id. at 417 (Cum. Supp. 1952) ; 26 TAXES 741 (1938);
1 P-H 1952 FED. TAx SEav. 12,020 et seq.
7. 'We agree with The Board [of Tax Appeals] that the provisions in the agree-
ment, that when the annual royalties amounting to $310,000 had been paid, the [lessors]
were to execute and deliver a deed in fee simple for all unmined coal and that the
petitioner was compelled to pay the $310,000 within the ten years ... , are entirely
foreign to an actual, bona fide lease and show the true nature of the agreement to be
a contract of sale rather than a lease." Jefferson Gas Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 52 F.2d
120, 122 (3d Cir. 1931). Cf. Watson v. Commissioner, 62 F2d 35, 36 (Pth Cir. 1932).
For the definition of a conditional sale and its "lease" counterpart, see 2 UNIFORM LAwS
ANNOTATED: CONDITIONAL SALES § 1, Commissioners' Note (1922). See also 2 WiLuLs-
TON, SALES § 336 (rev. ed. 1948) ; 3 JoNEs, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES
§ 958 (Bowers' ed. 1933).
8. Watson v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1932) (lessor) ; Jefferson Gas Coal
Co. v. Commissioner, 52 F2d 120 (3d Cir. 1931) (lessee) ; Hesler Machine & Marine Works,
Inc., 39 B.T.A. 644 (1939) (lessee); Alexander W. Smith, Jr., 20 B.T.A. 27 (1930)
(lessor and lessee) ; E. G. Robertson, 19 B.T.A. 534 (1930) (lessor).
9. "Cases like this, where payments at the time they are made have dual potentialities,
i.e., they may turn out to be payments of purchase price, or rent for the use of property, have
always been difficult to catalogue for income tax purposes." Chicago-Stoker Corp., 14 T.C,
441, 444 (1950). For differences between the disguised conditional sale and other lease-
purchase agreements, see 2 WILLISTON, SALES § 336, p. 298 (rev. ed. 1948); 3 JONES,
CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES §§ 952-63 (Bowers' ed. 1933); EAGE,
CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES §§ 303-05 (1941).
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has the option of withdrawing at any time during the lease term. 10 Often,
such contracts permit the lessee to acquire title early by a lump-sum payment
of the remaining rentals.'" The second lease-purchase type binds the lessee
to pay rent and gives him an option to purchase at the end of the lease for
a fixed sum.'- Sometimes the lessee can pay the option-price during the
term and take title, thereby avoiding the balance of the rentals.'2
Courts initially looked to the parties' intent in order to determine whether
a lease-purchase agreement constituted a sale.' 4 Courts presumed that the
lessee intended to purchase when rentals exceeded fair rental value 15 or an
option-price was below the property's worth.10 Other evidence of lessee's intent
to purchase included: expensive improvements ;17 lessor's placing the deed in
escrow;18 inconsistency of lessor's tax treatment with lessee's claim. ' But
economic data and other indicia of intent were usually ignored by courts
10. Title passes under such contracts when rentals paid equal the pre-fixed price for
the property. Rotorite Corp., 40 B.T.A. 1304 (1939), rev'd, 117 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1941) ;
Chicago-Stoker Corp., 14 T.C. 441 (1950); Truman Bowen, 12 T.C. 446 (1949) ; Mary
Alice Browning, P-H 1950 TC 1mu. DEc. 5 30,285 (1950).
11. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
12. E.g., Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952); Edward E. Haver-
stick, 13 B.T.A. 837 (1928); Holeproof Hosiery Co., 11 B.T.A. 547 (1923). Purchase
may be encouraged by a small option-price relative to the property's value. If so, rentals
undoubtedly would include part of the purchase price. Similarly, part of the rent may
be consideration for the option privilege itself. Lessee's option is "true' only when
the option price accurately reflects the property's estimated future worth, with rental
payments exclusively for the present use of the property. Theoretically, such an
option would have no monetary value at the time of contracting. It may acquire a
positive worth during the lease term because of a general price rise or improvements
added by lessee. But ownership of a valuable option by itself does not give the holder
a "legal" property interest. Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit & Invest. Co., 297 U.S. 495
(1936).
13. E.g, Gilken Corp., 10 T.C. 445 (1948); Helen E. Leatherb, 34 B.T.A. 196
(1936).
14. Watson v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir. 1932) (lessor); Jefferson Gas
Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 52 F.2d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1931) (lessee); Robert A. Taft, 27
B.T.A. S0, 811 (1933) (lessee); Alexander NV. Smith, Jr., 20 B.T.A. 27, 32 (1930)
(lessee and lessor); E. G. Robertson, 19 B.T.A. 534, 540 (1930) (lessor). The intent
criterion was brought into the tax field from other areas of the law where it had ben
used to determine whether a lease-option contract was a lease or conditional sale. Sec,
e.g., Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive works, 93 U.S. 664 (1876) (creditors' dispute
after lessee's bankruptcy), cited in Benton Y. Commissioner, 197 F2d 745, 752 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1952).
15. E.g., Holeproof Hosiery Co., 11 B.T.A. 547, 556 (1928).
16. E.g., Alexander NV. Smith, Jr., 20 B.T.A. 27, 32 (1930). Courts also considered:
the size of the initial "rental" payment relative to the total consideration necessary to buy
the property, Robert A. Taft, 27 B.T.A. 803, 812 (1933); Steve Lodzieski, P-H 1944
TC MFs. DEc. 1 44,326, p. 1171 (1944) ; whether or not rentals were to b2 credited against
a purchase price, Goldfields of America, Ltd., 44 B.T.A. 200, 201 (1941).
17. Rankin v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 76, 77 (6th Cir. 1932).
18. Alexander W. Smith, Jr., 20 B.T.A. 27, 32-3 (1930).
19. William A. McWalters, P-H 1950 TC MnL. D. ff 50,152, p. 434 (1950).
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when ruling on lessor's tax treatment of the rentals. Payments were part of
purchase price and therefore entitled to capital gains treatment by the lessor
only when his lessee was legally bound to consummate the sale.20 Under all
other leases, payments were ordinary income until exercise of the option to
purchase.21 Thus, under the same lease-purchase agreements, payments might
be purchase price to lessee and rent to lessor.
22
To provide a "fixed rule for guidance of taxpayers and the Commissioner,"2 ' 3
the Tax Court in 1948 abandoned "intent" in favor of a straight economic
test.2 4 When periodic payments exceeded fair rental value 2- , or an option-
20. Watson v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1932); Alexander W. Smith, Jr.,
20 B.T.A. 27 (1930); I.T. 1819, 11-2 Cum. Burt. 73 (1923). See 2 UNiro~m LAWS,
ANNOTA=D: CoNDiTIoNAL SALEs § 1, Commissioners' Note (1922). Courts recited eco-
nomic data and other indicia of intent in lessor cases only when the lessee was legally
bound to make all payments. The Watson and Smith cases are good examples of how
courts used intent evidence to buttress their findings of a conditional sale. Yet when
lessor's tenant was not legally bound, intent evidence was overlooked. See cases cited
in note 21 infra.
21. "That the amounts fixed as monthly payment may have been larger than would
otherwise have been collected as rent, may be true, but ... where the payments created
no equity for the lessee usndcr the terms of the instruments, we must hold that the
[Commissioner] correctly added the amounts received to the petitioner's [ordinary] in-
come." Edward E. Haverstick, 13 B.T.A. 837, 839 (1928) (emphasis added). Accord,
A. W. Henn, 20 B.T.A. 1133 (1930).
Exercise of the option binds vendee to pay the balance of the price and converts the
transaction into an outright or conditional sale. Payments received prior to the exercise of
the option were treated as ordinary income. Estate of Clarence B. Eaton, 10 T.C. 869
(1948) ; Indian Creek Coal & Coke Co., 23 B.T.A. 950 (1931). But cf. Rotorite Corp. v.
Commissioner, 117 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1941) (option exercised in middle of tax year;
court permits vendor to report all payments for that year as purchase price).
The dosing date of the sale, not the date of option-exercise, determined the year in
which the vendor reported his gain or loss. Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281
U.S. 11 (1930). See Young, Tax Problems in Real Estate Transactions, [1949] U. or!
ILL L. FoRUm 473.
22. "Since tax deductions by the buyer are controlled by the language of the deduc-
tion provision of the statute [§ 23(a) (1) (A)], there is no necessary reciprocal relation
between them and the taxation of the periodic payments received by him... ." Goldfields
of America, Ltd., 44 B.T.A. 200, 202 (1941). However, courts occasionally chafed at the
Commissioner's inconsistent treatment of the two parties to the same agreement. See
Rotorite Corp. v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 245, 247 (7th Cir. 1941). In one case, the
Commissioner brought lessor and lessee together before the Tax Court to resolve the
inconsistency in their treatment of the periodic payments. Alexander W. Smith, Jr., 20
B.T.A. 27 (1930).
23. Chicago-Stoker Corp., 14 T.C. 441, 444 (1950).
24. "[I]t matters not whether the contract was in the form of a lease or a conditional
sale, or what was the intention of the parties; if, under the terms of the contracts by
which the payments were made, the petitioner acquired an equity in the machinery, which
we so find, the payments would not be deductible, due to the limitation prescribed in the
code." Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25, 32 (1948) (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 33.
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price was below a reasonable estimate of the property's future worth.6 lessee
acquired an "'equity," losing his Section 23(a) (1) (A) rent deduction. Al-
though the economic test was originally applied in lessee cases, the Tax Court
by 1950 was also using it to measure the lessor's ta: liability.--- Lessor could
treat the payments as purchase price if they would not le deductible as rent by
his lessee.25 For the first time, therefore, lessurs could receive capital gains
treatment for income under a lease which did not bind the lessee to make all
payments.
In the first appellate court challenge to the new Tax Court alproach,
Benton v. C0o;zzission;er,29 a lessee case, the Fifth Circuit rejected the
economic test in favor of the pre-1948 "intent" criterion. Taxpayer was
lessee of a taxicab business for ten months during 1945-46. His monthly
rental was $5,000, and he had an option to purchase fur $35,000 at the end of the
lease period. Lessor, a partnership, had purchased the company only one year
before granting the lease and during that year had earned over $50,03 on an
investment of $60,000. When the lease expired, taxpayer exerci-ed his
option to purchase. The Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner's disallowance
of the taxpayer's Section 23 (a) (1) (A) rent deduction.- ') The court, applying
the economic test, found the option-price far below the property's value and
concluded that the rentals were disguised payments of purchase price. In
reversing, the Fifth Circuit held that the proper test of taxpayer's right to the
deduction was whether the parties i2tcnded a lease or conditional Fale.
Although economic factors were admittedly relevant, the court felt bound to
consider all circumstances bearing on the parties' intent. In finding that nu
sale was intended, the court noted that lessor had been listed as owner of the
company on the "assumed name" records of the county, while taxpayer was
listed as manager in the "City directory." Also, the m t active partner (in
lessor) kept in "close touch" with the business during the lease term and
reported the rentals as ordinary income on his tax returns. Furthermore, the
court was apparently not convinced that, as of the time of contracting, $35,000
26. H. T. Benton, P-H 19E0 TC MEM. DsFc. q 50,233, p. 737 (1950 ). re,"d, 197 F2d
745 (5th Cir. 1952).
27. The "transitional" case was Truman Bowen, 12 T.C. 446 (1949). Although the
court referred to the parties' intent, id. at 460-1, the ecvnomie test seemed decisive. Id. at
463-4. And the authority relied on by the court was the 194S lessee case (tvdso n .,ills)
that advanced the economic test. Ibid. Following Bowen, two cases ignored the parties'
intent Mary Alice Browning, P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEc. ff 502$5 (1950) ; Rnner & M, aras,
Inc., P-H 1950 TC M1wi. DEC. ff 50,139 (1950). Two recent cases, how'ever, again mention
the parties' intent W. H. Hughes, P-H 1952 TC MrzE. DEC. T 52,240 (1952) ; L. M. Grave-,
P-H 1952 TC M._-. DEc. f[ 52,143 (1952).
2S. Mary Alice Broxning, P-H 1950 TC ME,. DEc. '1 5285, p. 955 (1950) ; Renner
& 'Maras, Inc., P-H 1951 TC .M1m. DEc. r, 50,139, p. 423 19501. For the time v'hen
the payments may be taxed, see notes 41 and 42 i;fra and accomlpanying text.
29. 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952).
30. H. T. Benton, P-H 1950 TC M m. DEc. V 5U,223 (1950).
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was an unreasonable estimate of what the company would be worth after the
ten-month period. The end of World War II was approaching and with it
the need for additional expenditures to replace worn-out cabs and the
prospect of a decline in the volume of business.
Benton's restoration of the intent test seems unwise on policy grounds and
unwarranted by the Code. The test may revive much of the pre-1948
uncertainty over lessee's right to a rent deduction. While the economic test
confines serious argument to questions of fair rental value and the property's
prospective worth, all circumstances surrounding the transaction must now
be considered. True, most courts may decide cases on the basis of economic
data, despite verbal adherence to the intent formula and recitations of support-
ing evidence.31 But predicting what facts less perceptive courts will give de-
cisive weight may be impossible. Hence, the intent test might breed litigation,
as evidenced by the numerous pre-1948 lease-purchase agreements involved
in rent deduction cases. Furthermore, the intent test may result in deductions
seemingly not contemplated by Section 23(a) (1) (A). The section bars a
rent deduction when lessee has an "equity" or is "taking title." Lessee has
an "equity," unless the word is meaningless, regardless of his intent so long
as his payments reduce the price he would otherwise have to pay to buy the
property.3 2  In Benton, it is difficult to see how lessee did not have an
"equity" since his option-price was set at little more than half what lessor
had paid for the company one year earlier. And if, as the Fifth Circuit
suggested, $35,000 was not an unreasonably low estimate of the company's
future worth, then a $50,000 rental for the ten-month period would be ex-
orbitant unless taxicab businesses depreciate at an extraordinarily rapid rate.
Since the Tax Court had relied on lessee cases to support its application of
the economic test to lessors,33 Benton also undercuts the more recent lessor
tax treatment. If courts now apply a broad intent formula to lessors,8 4 then
the same inducements to litigation will exist here as in lessee cases. However,
courts may revert to their old lessor intent test, under which rentals were
purchase price only if the lessee was legally bound to make all the payments.85
31. See W. H. Hughes, P-H 1952 TC MEm. Dc. U 52,240 (1952) (decision rendered six
weeks after Benton). Cf. Truman Bowen, 12 T.C. 446 (1949). Tax Court findings of fact,
including a finding of "intent," have the same presumptive validity upon review, INT. Rtv.
CoDE § 1141 (a), as do findings of fact by the Federal district courts. Fni. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
See note 27 supra.
32. "Petitioners assert that the option to purchase was not exercised and this indicates
that petitioner had no equity in the property. It is the existence of the equity rather than
its acquirement which determines the applicability of the Code's provisions." H. T. Benton,
P-H 1950 TC ME .. Drc. ff 50,223, p. 739 (1950), revd, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952).
33. See note 27 suPra.
34. See note 27 supra. W. H. Hughes, P-H 1952 TC Mu~x. DEc. Uf 52,240 (1952) was
decided six weeks after Benton. Without citing Benton, the court referred to various
indicia of intent, id. at 708, with economic data perhaps decisive. Cf. L. M. Graves, P-H
1952 TC MEm. DEc. 52,143, p. 431 (1952).
35. See cases cited in note 8 vupra.
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Under all other leases, lessor's receipts before option-exercise would be
ordinary income. But this seems unfair. When payments exceed fair rental,
lessor must pay an ordinary income tax on money which may turn out to
have been part of the purchase price. Thus if payments after the option is
exercised equal or exceed the property's adjusted basis, all or part of the
lessor's actual profit on the sale will have been taxed as ordinary income
rather than as a capital gain under Section 117(j). On the other hand, if the
adjusted basis exceeds the payments received after exercise of the option, the
resulting loss 36 may or may not be useful to the lessor, depending upon his
income in the taxable year and in other years to which unused portions of
the loss may be carried.37 And even if the lessor can use his entireloss to
offset ordinary income, he will still suffer if the total payments (regardless
of when received) allocable to purchase price exceed the adjusted basis; his
entire profit will have been taxed as ordinary income.3s
On the other hand, capital gains treatment of all lessor's receipts is unduly
favorable, regardless of the test used by the courts. In part, lessee's payments
are for the present use of the property, rightfully allocable to rentP The
payments may be accurately labeled purchase price only to the extent that
they exceed fair rent, giving the lessee a financial stake in the useful life of
the property beyond the lease term.40 Capital gains treatment of the entire
payments ignores their dual function and prefers this taxpayer over the lessor
who rents at fair rental value and whose option-price accurately reflects the
property's estimated worth. Moreover, lessor might be able to postpone
realization of any taxable income, and liability for taxes, until his receipts
36. Whether it will be an ordinary or capital loss depends on the result of the § 117(j)
"hodge-podge." See note 5 supra. Section 117(j) losses can b2 deducted from ordinary
income only to the extent such losses exceed the gain from § 117(j) transactions in the
taxable year.
37. See INT. REv. CoDE § 122 (operating loss carry-over). Put cf. Lazier v. United
States, 170 F2d 519 (Sth Cir. 1943).
3S. To illustrate: assume that the property's § 113 adjusted basis is $75 on January 1,
and a depreciation deduction of $15 may be taken over the next ten months. The basis
after the ten months will thus be $60. Taxpayer leases the property at $20 for the period
(fair rental value) with an option to purchase for $100 (estimated market value). His
net ordinary (rental) income will be $5, and, when the option is exercised, he will
have a $40 capital gain. But if taxpayer leases for i0 v.ith an option-price of q0, he will
have ordinary (rental) income of $55 (rent of $70 less $15 of depreciation) and an off-
setting ordinary loss-assuming no other transactions under § 117(j)--of $10 (selling
price of $50 less basis of $60), or net income of $45. As a result, his $40 profit on the
sale is taxed at ordinary rates.
39. See BENHAM & Lurz, Ecoxomics 17 (1941); BLonzurr, Pmaxc1FLEsoF Eco-locs
343 (rev. ed. 1946).
40. See Fmrrap, PsxciPLEs op Ecoxomics 122 (1905); BLorcnrr, Pim.cmu.Es o Eco-
xomacs 344 (rev. ed. 1946) ; Hicxs & HAIDr, THE SocaA FRAmmoRE o THmt A.-MUncn
EcoNomY 153 n.8 (1945).
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exceed the property's basis.41 He thus enjoys the use of the money allocable
to rent, unreduced by any tax, until that later date. Lessor's net benefit,
therefore, is the tax saving on the "rent" phs the interest on the money that
normally would have been paid earlier in taxes.
The shortcomings of both straight ordinary income or capital gains treat-
ment suggest that an allocation of payments between rent and purchase price
would be the most appropriate method of taxing the lessor. That portion
of a payment attributable to rent should be included in ordinary income, any
excess reported as purchase price. Also, the lessor, as well as the lessee, should
be permitted to take depreciation deductions. This approach would neither
penalize nor reward the lessor; his tax bill would be computed on the basis of
fair rental value and a "true" option-price. And to the extent that lessor does
receive purchase price, he has the choice of recognizing his gain when such
receipts exceed the property's basis or reporting income by the installment
method. 42 Moreover, allocation should be made as of the time of contracting,
grounded on estimates of fair rent and the future value of the property.43 Other-
wise, fluctuations in economic conditions and the price level might lead to
multiple reallocations, an unnecessary administrative burden. Although alloca-
tion would be equally desirable for lessees, the wording of Section 23(a) (1)
(A), unchanged since 1916,4 4 precludes such treatment.
Retention of the economic test is a prerequisite to an allocation procedure,
By definition, the test is concerned with the real economic function of the
41. Truman Bowen, 12 T.C. 446, 466-7 (1949). See 1 MoNrGo-mEY, FEDIiAL TAxrq
56-7 (1952). For tax treatment of lessor if lessee fails to exercise his option, see Renner
& Maras, Inc., P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEC. ff 50,139 (1950). However, it seems unlikely that
many lessees will fail to purchase if their payments exceed fair rental value. Once lessee
pays a substantial portion of the "rentals," he would benefit by acquiring the property even
if only to resell; a resale might enable him to recoup at least part of the past payments
attributable to purchase price which he would otherwise forfeit. See Chicago-Stoker Corp.
v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 441 (1950).
42. Truman Bowen, 12 T.C. 446, 467 (1949). In Bowen, the Commissioner unsuccess-
fully sought to impose the installment method on the lessor. Cf. L. M. Graves, P-H 1952
TC NMfr. DEc. 1" 52,143 (1952). Permitting the lessor to defer recognition of gain until
purchase price receipts exceed the property's basis favors him, since he has the use of the
purchase money-unreduced by a tax-until the basis is exceeded or lessee declines the
option. See Renner & Maras, Inc., P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEC. ff 50,139 (1950) (lessee de-
clined option). Because an allocation procedure would deny lessors the broader tax ad-
vantages previously enjoyed, the Commissioner may no longer be anxious to require re-
porting by the installment method. For the mechanics of the installment method, see INT.
Ray. Copy § 44; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.44-1 (1943); 1 P-H 1952 FE. T, x Simv.
1f 6665 (1952).
43. Under the economic test, fair rental value and the property's worth at the end of
the lease term must be estimated as of the time of contracting. Benton v. Commissioner,
197 F.2d 745, 752 (5th Cir. 1952).
44. The Revenue Act of 1913, 38 STAT. 114, 167, 172 (1913), provided for a rental
deduction; the present language of § 23(a) (1) (A) was substituted by § 12(a) of the 1916
Act, 39 STAT. 756, 767 (1916). See note 1 supra.
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lease-purchase payment. The intent test, on the other hand, seeks only to
affix the categorical label of "sale" or "no sale,"4 ' distorting the hybrid
nature of the contract. Furthermore, the Commissioner and courts must be
willing to assume the burden of computing a reasonable estimate of the prop-
erty's rental and future value.4G The necessary computations are no more diffi-
cult than allocations now required under other sections of the Code.4 And
fairly simple devices are available to minimize the threat of groundless claims
to an allocation .4
45. Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745, 752 (5th Cir. 1952).
46. Courts have been reluctant to allocate for the parties under lease-purchase agree-
ments. See, e.g., Edward E. Haverstick, 13 B.T.A. 837, 839 (192).
47. E.g., Ih-'r. Rzv. CODE § 45. See, generally, 3 P-H 1952 FED. TAx Smv. V 29,017.
48. Whenever a lessor allocates, the Commissioner should inspect the lessee's return.
If the lessee does not claim a rent deduction for the payments he makcs under the lease-
purchase agreement, the Commissioner s primary concern will then ba with the reason-
ableness of the lessor's allocation. However, if the lessee does claim a rent deduction, thi
Commissioner should challenge both the lessee's and the lessor's return. In effect, the
lessee rather than the Commissioner can be made the lessor's adverse party. Cf. Alexander
W. Smith, Jr., 20 B.T.A. 27 (1930). Tax avoidance thruugh an allocation of payments
received under a lease-purchase agreement would probably be unattractive to normally
responsible businessmen who know that part of the price will b litigation, with their
lessees as adverse parties.
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